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In April 1941, Ante Pavelic´, the fascist leader of the Independent State of Croatia,
and his paramilitary force, the Ustasˇe (‘‘rebels’’), began a genocide that killed at
least 330,000 Serbs and essentially eliminated Jews and Roma from Croatia. The
American response to genocide in Croatia provides a fuller context for examining
Washington’s reaction to the Nazi genocide. By the summer of 1941, the US
government had reliable information that genocide was taking place in Croatia.
Washington expressed little interest in this slaughter, except insofar it affected
Croatian–American and Serbian–American relations; made no direct public
statement condemning the Ustasˇe’s actions; and offered no protest to the Vatican.
Croatian events, however, propelled the FBI and the Office of War Information to
suppress pro-Ustasˇe supporters in the United States.
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For much of World War II, a substantial amount of the US State Department’s
information about Croatia originated in Ankara and Istanbul. Neutral Turkey,
situated at an important crossroads for Germany, Britain, the United States, and the
Soviet Union, was an excellent location for mischief and fact finding. All belligerents
found it a convenient playground for cloak-and-dagger operations, as well as a more
innocuous center for information gathering. On 6 May 1941, a disturbing telegram,
which foreshadowed future events, arrived in the State Department from the
American embassy in Ankara. Rushed to Washington, the telegram contained
information gained from Yugoslav contacts. The alarming message read, ‘‘according
to dependable information partizans of Pavelic´ (in some cases in conjunction with
Magyars) are massacring Serbs in Croatia, the Voyvodina and Bosnia. There is need of
urgent intervention by the Vatican at Zagreb and Budapest.’’1 The intervention so
desperately sought never materialized. No one came to the aid of Serbs, Jews, and
Roma who suffered so mightily under Ante Pavelic´’s reign in the alleged Independent
State of Croatia. This telegram was the first report received in Washington that spoke
of the slaughter, which eventually reached catastrophic proportions. By the end of the
war, Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇe (the paramilitary force he founded in 1929) had murdered
between 330,000 and 390,000 Serbs, many of whom were tortured and executed in the
most despicable manner.2 Tens of thousands were forced to convert, often at gunpoint,
from Orthodoxy to Catholicism. The Jewish and Roma populations, substantially
smaller, were all but eliminated.
Historians have paid little attention to America’s role in confronting Ante Pavelic´’s
killing spree.3 Much has been written about Washington’s response to Nazi mass
murder, but the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Drzˇava Hrvatska, or NDH)
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has been left out of this discussion. Historians have given only a passing glance at
America’s views of and policy toward Croatian wartime atrocities. Washington’s
reaction to atrocities in Croatia offers an interesting case study and provides a fuller
context for evaluating America’s reaction to World War II genocide. Although policy-
makers learned of the Independent State of Croatia’s massacres at an early date, the
evidence of the slaughter did not move them to significant action. The White House
and the State Department made no detailed and direct public statements about the
atrocities being perpetrated in the NDH. Even with accurate information in hand,
much of it arriving early in the course of the genocide, officials in Washington chose to
remain aloof.
It is easy to criticize American officials for failing to publicly decry the atrocities in
the NDH or to attempt in any significant way to influence Pavelic´’s regime. Regardless
of the vivid and often thorough reports of mass slaughter, American officials offered few
internal or external comments about these atrocities, even after the United States
entered the war. With a strong current of non-intervention and nativism focusing
attention on domestic issues, one can understand why policy makers made the decisions
they did. Policy toward the atrocities was dictated by the need to limit ethnic tension
between Serbian Americans and Croatian Americans. The American government was
concerned that the crisis in Croatia had the potential to foster violence in the United
States that would weaken the domestic war effort, especially in heavy industry, where
Yugoslav immigrants tended to work. This was a highly practical way of responding to
atrocities in a small, distant land that only rarely garnered American attention.
The Ustasˇe
To fully appreciate American response to the atrocities in the Independent State of
Croatia, one must examine Ustasˇe ideology and the activities of the organization once
it gained power in Croatia. The ideological foundation of the Ustasˇe reaches back to the
nineteenth century, when Ante Starcˇevic´ established the Party of Right. Starcˇevic´,
a stalwart opponent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, consistently favored Croatian
independence and rejected any idea of a Yugoslavia, as supported by Bishop Josip
Strossmayer. Josip Frank was the heir to Starcˇevic´’s gospel, but Frank reversed a key
aspect of Starcˇevic´’s views: hoping to elevate Croatia’s political prestige in the Dual
Monarchy, Frank’s Pure Party of Rights supported the regime. Although there were
different opinions about Croatia’s role in the Habsburg Empire, Frank’s party
embraced Starcˇevic´’s view that Serbs were the enemy of Croatian political and
territorial ambitions. As time passed, aggressively anti-Serbian views became the
hallmark of the Pure Party of Rights. With the collapse of the Dual Monarchy and the
creation of Yugoslavia, Frank’s party descended deeper into its anti-Serbian and anti-
Orthodox positions. They were fervent opponents of the centralist 1921 constitution,
believing that the document extinguished hope for Croatian independence while
ensuring Serbian hegemony in the new state. In this they were not alone. The Croatian
Peasant Party, the political voice for the majority of Croatians, also opposed the 1921
constitution.4
Those in tune with Frank’s violent anti-Serbian positions found a unifying voice in
Ante Pavelic´. A native of Bradina, Pavelic´ emerged in the 1920s as the leading
spokesman for Croatian independence. Fully embracing the anti-Serb views of
Starcˇevic´ and Frank, and believing that a professional revolutionary organization
was needed if Croatia were to gain its independence, Pavelic´, a lawyer by training,
established the Ustasˇe along the lines of Bulgaria’s infamous Internal Macedonian
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Revolutionary Organization (IMRO). From its inception in 1929, the Ustasˇe was
violent and revolutionary.5 Their beliefs were a collection of seemingly disparate
ideologies bound together in one movement. In this way, they hoped to attract a wide
variety of followers. In Ustasˇe ideology, one could be a proto-fascist and, at the same
time, a deep believer in Catholicism. At its ideological core was a fervent, mystical
belief in the holiness and sanctity of the Croatian state. As Ustasˇe’s architect, Pavelic´
maintained that Croatians had established a state 1,400 years earlier and that, over
the centuries, they had never abandoned their right to independence. Regardless
of the Ottomans, the Habsburgs, or the Karadjordjevic´s, Croatia had always
existed. Therefore, Pavelic´’s chief goal was the resurrection of an independent
Croatian state with borders corresponding to earlier manifestations of Croatia.
This objective was achievable only through the destruction of Serbian—foreign—
influence within Croatia, which, in turn, necessitated the annihilation of Yugoslavia.
Correspondingly, the well-being of the state was of such significance that individual
rights ran a distant second to the establishment and maintenance of Croatia. Pavelic´’s
fascist tendencies were apparent.6
In their desire to demonstrate the distinctiveness of their people, the Ustasˇe
deemed Croatians of pure peasant stock a separate nationality from their Balkan
neighbors. By the beginning of World War II, Ustasˇe ideologues would proclaim that
Croats were Goths, and therefore of Germanic origin, far removed from the inferior
Slavic Serbs. Any myth could be used to separate Croatians from Serbs. Like the Nazis,
the Ustasˇe placed the peasant on a pedestal, extolling his virtues of clean living and
hard work. The peasant was nearly incorruptible, and there was much discussion of
establishing a peasant republic. Both Nazi and Croatian currency during World War II
featured images of the solid and pure peasant. Pavelic´, though he believed in the
virtues of the peasant, was a clever politician who judged that such depictions would
attract disenchanted peasants to his cause while weakening the Croatian Peasant
Party.
Another key aspect of Ustasˇe ideology was a deep-seated commitment to the
Catholic faith. As a devoted Catholic, Pavelic´ believed that Croatians had been chosen
by God to defend Catholicism against assaults from both Orthodoxy and Communism.
This religious zeal, which held no tolerance for Orthodoxy, helped provide a spiritual
appeal to the Ustasˇe movement. According to Pavelic´ and his minions, Croatians had
been warriors and martyrs for Christianity and needed to continue the good fight for
their independence, which would only strengthen them as the ‘‘bulwark of
Christianity.’’ This fervor enabled Pavelic´ to successfully demonize Serbs. He did not
despise Serbs simply because they were a different ethnic group, one that had
exercised power over all of Yugoslavia for the past decade, but also because they
embraced Orthodoxy, a foreign faith that, the Ustasˇe believed, was encouraged by the
Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government. Thus Orthodoxy was viewed as a tool for
smashing Croatian national identity. Likewise, communists, who were on the march in
the 1920s and 1930s, were mortal foes of Catholicism and had to be stopped.7 To the
Ustasˇe, Croatians faced both political and religious enemies who were determined to
destroy Croatian culture, its traditions, its language, its political life, and its religion.
In other words, Ustasˇe ideology encouraged something akin to a holy war.
Perhaps the best description of Ustasˇe sentiment came during World War II from a
Lieutenant Milosˇ, an Ustasˇe guard. Speaking to Vladko Macˇek, the leader of the
Croatian Peasant Party and his prisoner, about the terrible murders of Serbs, Milosˇ
justified his and the Ustasˇe’s actions by saying, ‘‘I am perfectly aware of what is in
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store for me. For my past, present and future deeds I shall burn in hell, but at least
I shall burn for Croatia.’’8 Such extreme nationalistic zealotry was the foundation for a
loyal core of Ustasˇe.
After King Aleksandar’s coup in January 1929, Pavelic´, fearing arrest, fled
Yugoslavia and proceeded to organize the Ustasˇe. His recruiting efforts, coupled with
his publicly admitted goal of overthrowing the Yugoslav state, forced Belgrade to
convict him of treason and hang the death penalty over his head. Not in the least
deterred, Pavelic´ stepped up his recruiting efforts. Hoping to create absolute loyalty
and esprit de corps, he required all members to swear allegiance to himself and to the
independence of Croatia in an elaborate ceremony that included a knife, a revolver,
and a crucifix. The Ustasˇe’s motto, Za Dom Spremni (‘‘Ready for the Fatherland’’), was
meant to rally his followers into fighting for an independent Croatia. Pavelic´’s
recruiting efforts, however, achieved only modest results, since most Croatians were
repelled by his radical demands and his willingness to use violence. The majority of
Croatians followed Macˇek of the Croation Peasant Party, who, although lacking in
glamor, was seen as the only realistic option for gaining Croatian autonomy. Unable to
recruit many followers, the Ustasˇe remained a fringe operation with little support
within Yugoslavia. It survived by attracting thugs, the highly impressionable, and the
unemployed. By 1934, Pavelic´ had amassed an army of perhaps 500 to 600, mostly
disenchanted ne’er-do-wells. Though his numbers were small, Pavelic´ had established
an organization of men willing to sacrifice their lives for the Ustasˇe cause.
The Ustasˇe scored a significant success in 1934, when Pavelic´ planned the
successful assassination of King Aleksandar I of Yugoslavia in Marseilles. This
audacious crime attracted worldwide attention, but it did not lead to the dismember-
ment of Yugoslavia, as Pavelic´ had hoped. Having received his second death sentence,
this time from a French court, Pavelic´ spent the remainder of the 1930s in Benito
Mussolini’s Italy. Often Pavelic´’s protector, Il Duce believed that Pavelic´ was a
destabilizing force for Yugoslavia, who could be useful to Italian interests if Yugoslavia
were divided into its constituent parts. Mussolini hoped that Italy would one day gain
the Dalmatian coast that had been promised to it in the 1915 Treaty of London.9
Internally, tensions between Serbs and Croats continued to spell trouble for
Yugoslavia. Prince Paul and Vladko Macˇek signed the the sporazum (agreement) of
20 August 1939, hoping that it would quell unrest between Serbs and Croats and thus
strengthen Yugoslavia. This agreement provided for an autonomous Croatia within
Yugoslavia. Under the sporazum, Zagreb controlled its internal affairs through a sabor
(assembly) and a ban (governor), while Belgrade remained paramount in foreign
policy, defense, and the like. The sporazum, however, did little to solve the ethnic
problems. Muslims and Serbs who now found themselves under a Croatian
government feared for their rights, believing that Belgrade had abandoned them.
Likewise, Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇe opposed the sporazum, calling it another attempt by
Serbs to dominate Croatians. They argued that the accord did not go far enough, since
it excluded Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatian control and allowed for too much
authority from Belgrade. Pavelic´ insisted that no agreement was possible and that the
only solution was independence. His views were little more than sour grapes, because
the agreement was certainly a step in the direction desired by the majority of
Croatians. Although the sporazum was a noble attempt to unify Yugoslavia, it was too
little too late. The result was a more deeply divided Yugoslavia.
With war clouds descending over Europe, the sporazum never had an opportunity
to gain momentum. As the Third Reich extended its dominance over the continent,
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German ambitions began to dictate policy in Eastern Europe. It was only a matter of
time before Yugoslavia would have to choose whether or not to throw in its lot with the
Nazis. After Bulgaria joined the German camp on 1 March 1941, it was apparent that
Yugoslavia was going to sign the Tripartite Pact, regardless of political pressure from
Western nations. Prince Paul, Yugoslavia’s regent, believed that his signature, with a
bit of luck, would preserve some degree of independence and avoid bloodshed. Yugoslav
officials negotiated clauses that stipulated only political affiliation and did not
mandate military ties, a point that had no validity in Berlin. As Germany gained
influence in Bulgaria and pressure over the Italian debacle in Greece mounted, placing
Yugoslavia in an untenable position, Prime Minister Dragisˇa Cvetkovic´ and Prince
Paul joined the fascists by signing the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941 in Vienna.
As this crisis was brewing in 1941, President Franklin Roosevelt, in conflict with
the State Department’s wishes, began to show an interest in Yugoslavia. Before
Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt sent William ‘‘Wild Bill’’ Donovan on
a fact-finding mission into the Balkans, on the outside chance that Donovan could help
create a Balkan front against German aggression.10 Although such a policy was far
from feasible, Roosevelt realized that Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general were an
important factor in the drive to stymie German expansion. The president went so far
as to promise Yugoslavia access to Lend-Lease if it remained independent of
Germany’s clutches. This was not a significant carrot for Yugoslavia, however, with
the United States thousands of miles away and Germany on their doorstep. When Paul
signed the Tripartite Pact, Roosevelt immediately showed his displeasure by ordering
that all Yugoslav assets in the United States be frozen. The regent had done what he
believed was right for Yugoslavia.
The Yugoslav government, however, had signed its own death warrant, as
Yugoslavs erupted in protest against the Tripartite Pact. Cvetkovic´’s government
lasted for only two more tumultuous days, both full of demonstrations against
Germany and demands for the government’s resignation. The Yugoslav military,
which leaned toward the Western Allies, could not stomach joining the Tripartite Pact,
believing it spelled the end of Yugoslavia and placed them squarely in the camp of their
long-term enemies. With the British urging a coup d’e´tat, the military overthrew the
government and established a new regime, under General Dusˇan Simovic´, in the name
of eighteen-year-old King Peter II. In a lightning stroke, fascism was rejected, the
regency had ended, and young Peter was king.
The US State Department was jubilant over this turn of events and ordered its
minister to Yugoslavia, Arthur Bliss Lane, with great haste, to express America’s
approval of the coup. Lane was directed to proclaim that ‘‘this event constitutes a
matter for self-congratulation for every liberty-loving man and woman.’’11 Washington
wanted the new government to know that,
in accordance with the provisions of the Lend-Lease Bill, the President, in the interest
of the national defense of the United States, is enabled to provide assistance to
Yugoslavia, like all other nations which are seeking to maintain their independence and
integrity and to repel aggression.12
Obviously Roosevelt wished to continue the policy of promising military equipment to
Yugoslavia in return for a continued stand against Germany.
By all accounts, Hitler was furious at the coup and demanded that Yugoslavia be
crushed. The Fu¨hrer was certain that Yugoslavia would easily collapse under German
military might, judging that the Croatians would side with Berlin against Belgrade.
Hitler was correct in his estimation. As Ulrich von Hassell, former German
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ambassador to Rome, commented during his visit to Zagreb in March 1941, ‘‘Freundt
(German Consul in Agram) and all Croats with whom I spoke emphasized the great
differences between Croatia and Serbia. In Croatia there is no opposition whatever to
Germany (with a few exceptions); on the contrary, a desire to co-operate.’’13
On 6 April 1941, German forces invaded Yugoslavia; in a matter of days,
Yugoslavia was defeated. With the approval of Berlin, Mussolini quickly moved to
install Ante Pavelic´ as the poglavnik of the alleged Independent State of Croatia.14
Pavelic´, with a small number of devoted Ustasˇe, entered the new satellite state on
13 April.
Genocide
Upon gaining power, Pavelic´ wasted no time in attacking Serbs, Jews, Roma, and
Croatians who opposed the NDH. His initial step was to protect the NDH by
eliminating all who spoke out against it, while placing all non-Croatians on the fringes
of society by revoking their citizenship. Similar to Jews in the Third Reich, Orthodox
citizens were required to wear blue armbands bearing the letter P, for Pravoslavac
(Orthodox). Meanwhile, the Cyrillic alphabet was prohibited on 25 April 1941, an act
designed to destroy Serbian identity and transform those Serbs deemed most pliable
into Croatians. All schools operated by the Orthodox Church were closed. Serbs were
banned from Croatian businesses and denied access to public events such as films and
concerts. Over time, Serbian private property was confiscated, much of it going directly
to the NDH leadership.15
The Ustasˇe’s position on citizenship, made clear in the Law Concerning
Nationality, provided the legal foundation for ending the non-Croatian presence in
the NDH. Decreed by Pavelic´ on 30 April 1941, this law stated that
a citizen is a national of Aryan origin who has proven by his conduct that he did not
engage in activities against the liberation efforts of the Croatian people and who is
ready and willing to serve faithfully the Croatian nation and the Independent State of
Croatia.16
This sweeping edict effectively reduced all Serbs, Jews, and Roma, as well as any
Croatians who had opposed independence or the NDH, to the status of aliens residing
within Croatia. The law fit perfectly with the Ustasˇe’s position that Croatia should be
ruled and inhabited only by ‘‘pure’’ Croatians, those who supported the NDH.
What gave added strength to the above-mentioned edicts was the broad Law on the
Protection of the People and the State, issued by Pavelic´ on 17 April, which decreed
that
whoever in any way does or has done harm to the honor and vital interests of the
Croatian nation or who endangers in any way the existence of the Independent State of
Croatia or its government authorities, shall be considered guilty of high treason, even if
his act was but a mere attempt.17
Acts of treason were punishable by death. In essence, the law gave the NDH carte
blanche to arrest and execute anyone who opposed the state in any way. Since it was
retroactive, it could even be used against those who opposed the Ustasˇe before they
came to power. Execution was meted out summarily to those who were found guilty of
violating the law by hastily organized ‘‘People’s Courts.’’18
Beginning in the spring and summer of 1941 and continuing until the end of the
war, Pavelic´ and his henchmen unleashed a reign of terror rarely paralleled in history.
A veritable murderous frenzy possessed the Ustasˇe, whose goal, according to an
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infamous statement by Mile Budak, minister of education and doglavnik (second to
Pavelic´), was to ‘‘convert a third, expel a third and kill a third’’ of the Serbs.19 Budak, a
well-known novelist and journalist and an outspoken Ustasˇe supporter, publicly
outlined this policy in Gospic´ on 22 June. According to Budak’s plan, Serbian culture
would be eliminated from Croatia either by extermination, exile, or assimilation.
And so began a killing spree designed to purify the new Croatia. The Ustasˇe’s
viciousness shocked even Nazi observers. Describing the horror, the late Irish
historian Jonathan Steinberg wrote,
Serbian and Jewish men, women and children were literally hacked to death. Whole
villages were razed to the ground and the people driven into barns to which the Ustasi
set fire. There is in the Italian Foreign Ministry archive a collection of photographs of
the butcher knives, hooks and axes used to chop up Serbian victims. There are
photographs of Serb women with breasts hacked off by pocket knives, men with eyes
gouged out, emasculated and mutilated.20
Serb men, women, and children were pushed from cliffs, plunging to their deaths.
Whole villages of Serbs were annihilated. Unlike Germany’s systematic executions,
often conducted in a clinical and sterile fashion, the Ustasˇe reveled in their bloodlust,
employing various acts of torture such as skinning and burning victims alive. Sexual
mutilation was far from unknown and was embraced by the especially wicked. Some
Serbs were hacked to pieces, with their noses, ears, and tongues cut off. These
techniques were often meted out to Orthodox priests, the Ustasˇe’s most hated enemy.
There was little effort to bury the dead, unless victims had previously dug their own
graves at gunpoint. Often, Ustasˇe victims were left to rot in the open; sometimes they
were tossed into the Sava River. Such unspeakable acts were commonplace.21
In Glina, for example, about 600 Serb men, women, and children were shot,
stabbed, and beaten to death in their Orthodox church, which was subsequently
burned. The murders continued unabated throughout the summer of 1941. Konstantin
Fotic´, Yugoslavia’s minister to Washington, wrote that
Thousands of corpses were dumped into the Sava River, which flows into the Danube at
Belgrade, with the inscription ‘‘Visa for Serbia’’ on tags around their necks. The
river . . . became so contaminated by these corpses that access to its beaches was
prohibited by the German occupiers during the whole summer of 1941.22
In June 1941, the NDH began deporting selected Serbs from Croatia. They created
the Drzˇavno Ravnateljstvo (State Directorate for Renewal), which established camps
designed to assemble Serbs for resettlement. It did not take long before these camps,
rife with disease as a result of poor sanitation and notorious for brutal treatment,
became, in effect, death camps. To the casual observer, they did not look much like
camps; instead, they resembled cattle pens. There were few barracks, and those that
existed offered little sanctuary from the elements. Serbs were tossed into barbed-wire
enclosures and forced to live in deplorable conditions. The NDH had no desire to
resettle anyone; their ambition was to kill. The Serbs who did not die from exposure or
malnutrition were executed by other means, such as axe blows and shooting. The open-
air camps merely aided the execution process.
The most infamous of all the camps was Jasenovac, where thousands of men,
women, and children were butchered with bullets, axes, hammers, and any other
instrument available.23 Built in a low-lying flood plain, Jasenovac was established in
August 1941 and quickly grew into the third-largest concentration camp in Europe.
In fact it was a series of five camps, located along the Sava River south of Zagreb.
Jasenovac was the Croatian Auschwitz: torture and execution were daily occurrences
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for Jews and Serbs alike, and guards needed only the flimsiest of excuses to shoot
prisoners. The chief execution site was at Gradina, where thousands were killed by
Ustasˇe guards. Like German-operated camps, Jasenovac discriminated on arrival
between useful prisoners and those deemed suitable only for execution. Those without
needed skills were summarily killed shortly after arriving in the camp, while those
who were allowed to live endured a slow death from strenuous labor, malnutrition,
physical abuse, and unsanitary living conditions. Anyone hardy and skillful enough to
survive longer than three months was summarily executed, in accordance with camp
rules.24
Although Ustasˇe ideology directed the greatest attention toward the Serbs, Pavelic´
wasted little time in unleashing brutal attacks on Jews, chiefly because he recognized
that he had to satisfy Hitler and the Nazis in order to remain in power. Like the Serbs,
the Jews were rounded up by the NDH beginning in the summer of 1941. Following
Hitler’s lead, the NDH stripped Jews of their citizenship and property, forced them to
wear a yellow star armband, forbade them to marry gentiles, and removed them from
all government positions. Before the end of 1941, most were well on their way to
extermination. The Jewish community in Sarajevo, which totaled about 10,000, was an
early and easy target. By the end of 1942, Sarajevo’s Jews and most other Jews either
were confined to concentration camps or had been executed. Most of Zagreb’s
approximately 10,000 Jews avoided the death camps until 1944.25 The Ustasˇe enjoyed
great success in abolishing the Jewish presence in Croatia by killing all but a few
thousand Jews, confiscating all their private property, and destroying almost all the
synagogues in the country. Hitler and his henchmen were more than satisfied with
their understudy’s treatment of Croatian Jews.
Since Raphael Lemkin coined the term ‘‘genocide,’’ controversy has swirled about
applying the term to particular atrocities.26 Soon after World War II ended, the
Yugoslav government, recognizing that ethnic hatreds emerging from the war had the
capacity to destabilize the new Communist regime, tried to paper over wartime
atrocities, hoping to establish a Yugoslav identity. Although the goal was to mask
specific ethnic losses by extolling the dead, collectively, as victims of fascism, it did not
take long for nationalism-driven figures to re-emerge, seeking to address wartime
atrocities. Those killed by the NDH became a political football used by Serbian
nationalists to attack all Croatians as enemies of Serbia and Yugoslavia. Serb victims
of the Ustasˇe became symbols of Serb suffering and martyrdom that complemented the
theme of romanticized suffering, an important component of Serbian history. In this
way, Serbian history could be interpreted through the mythology created around such
events as the defeat at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the heroic retreat through
Albania during World War I. Even today, the Kosovo question resonates in a similar
fashion. As Croatian national identity reemerged in the 1960s, Croatian nationalists
sought to minimize the events in the NDH, explaining Serbian accusations of genocide
as out of context and exaggerated.27 Croatians wanted to turn attention toward the
Bleiberg Massacre, when British troops returned Croatians to Yugoslavia to be
slaughtered by Tito’s Partisans. Through a denial of the extent of Ustasˇe crimes,
Croatian history could be safely rescued from the blemish of genocide and refocused on
the new paradigm of a long, noble history of fighting for independence. Even Ante
Pavelic´ could be rehabilitated as a hero of Croatian independence.28 During the
warfare of the 1990s, focus on the NDH’s atrocities reached its apex, and the atrocities
of World War II were used extensively by both sides to justify all kinds of horrific
acts.29 This heated debate between Croatian and Serbian camps has made it difficult
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for historians to develop a sober understanding of the NDH atrocities perpetrated
during World War II.
If one examines the standard for genocide outlined by the 1948 UN Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (UNCG), Ustasˇe murders
meet the criteria.30 But this standard has received much criticism for being too narrow
and much too obtuse. Over the last several years, numerous scholars have devoted
themselves to studying the problematic nature of the UNCG, while sometimes
providing or calling for a definition of genocide.31 Crafting such a definition has been
difficult, often politically charged. By most of these definitions, especially those
established by Ben Kiernan, Helen Fein, and Robert Melson, the Ustasˇe were guilty of
genocide.32 Ante Pavelic´ targeted Serbs as a specific ethnic group; NDH policies
initiated the campaign to destroy the Serbian presence in Croatia, including its
historical legacy.
There is precedent for calling NDH atrocities ‘‘genocide.’’ Edmond Paris, in 1961,
was the first author to term the Ustasˇe slaughters ‘‘genocide’’; Paris’s version of
events, though emotionally driven and lacking in context and perspective, brought
attention to atrocities in the NDH.33 Since that time, several historians, devoid
of nationalist sentiments and emotional judgments, have applied the term to the
events in the NDH. In 1968, John A. Armstrong wrote that ‘‘genocide, in the most
literal sense of the term, was the Ustasa ‘final’ solution.’’34 In Accounting for Genocide,
Helen Fein agrees with other historians that the atrocities in the NDH were
genocide.35 Leo Kuper has echoed these sentiments; Kuper calls Ustasˇe actions
‘‘genocide,’’ explaining that they ‘‘arose out of a long history of conflict between Croats
and Serbs, fuelled later in the newly constituted state of Yugoslavia by Croatian
resentment of Serbian hegemony and repression.’’36 Other notable scholars such as
Bette Denich, Robert Hayden, and Michael Sells have used the term ‘‘genocide’’ to
describe the NDH’s behavior.37 More recently, in The Catholic Church and the
Holocaust, Michael Phayer terms Ustasˇe actions in the NDH ‘‘genocide’’ in his
discussion of the Vatican’s culpability in Ustasˇe atrocities perpetrated against Serbs,
Jews, and Roma.38 It appears clear that Ustasˇe actions in the Independent State of
Croatia did constitute genocide.
The United States Loses a Listening Post
The rapid and successful German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941 forced Lane
and the American delegation in Belgrade to vacate the country, leaving the Zagreb
consulate as America’s only representation in Croatia and, for that matter, in
Yugoslavia. But Consul John J. Meily’s outpost was not destined to last for long.
The Ustasˇe had no interest in offending their fascist masters by keeping a potential
security risk open and running. Croatian authorities were suspicious of the close ties
that had existed between the British and American consulates prior to the German
invasion and seized this opportunity to prove their mettle. In June 1941, Meily was
summoned to the Croatian Foreign Ministry and ordered to close the consulate.
The State Department offered no resistance, because Washington did not wish to
operate a consulate in a county it did not recognize and was planning to close it
voluntarily. Maintaining the consulate could be construed as tacit recognition of the
Croatian state, something Washington wished to avoid. In late August and early
September, Croatian authorities, with the help of the Italian press, accused Meily, a
diplomat sympathetic to Croatian interests, of spying on behalf of the British. Their
evidence, based on a few seized American documents, did little more than prove that
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Meily had worked closely with the British, which was certainly no surprise in the days
of Lend-Lease. Croatian accusations of espionage were far from valid. This weak
attempt to embarrass Washington and ingratiate the NDH with the rest of the Axis
never bore fruit.39
With no diplomatic ties to Croatia, the United States gained information about the
Pavelic´ regime from various other locations. Ankara and Istanbul became natural
centers for information through Turkey’s juxtaposition to the Balkans, physically and
historically, and its neutrality. The country was teaming with ex-patriates, including a
large number of businessmen, and served as a clearinghouse for news and rumor.
Neutral Switzerland was another place where information on Croatia arrived,
especially on Allan Dulles’s desk. Another source used later in the war was operatives
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). All these outlets proved to be remarkably
reliable and detailed in their news gathering and analysis on Pavelic´’s Croatia. Though
rarely closely involved in Croatian affairs, Washington had channels for regular and
often trustworthy information.
Washington Learns of the Massacres
Even with Yugoslavia ripped apart by the Nazi juggernaught, it did not take long for
Washington to learn about the atrocities being committed in Pavelic´’s new state. One
of Lane’s last telegrams from Belgrade reported that ‘‘Serbs and Jews in Zagreb have
been ordered to leave portion of city north of Illice Street. All Serbs expelled from
government position in Croatia.’’40 This message, sent via Budapest, was an indication
that Pavelic´ was following a pattern established by his fascist friends in Germany.
In June 1941, a Standard Oil Company employee who had recently left Zagreb offered
more evidence of persecutions conducted by the Pavelic´ regime when he reported to the
American delegation in Geneva that ‘‘a reign of terror’’ had descended on Serbs and
Jews.41 Although he did not mention deaths or executions, he explained that theft and
looting were widespread. It was becoming obvious that a very dangerous situation was
developing in Croatia.
On 14 August 1941, a letter, accompanied by sixteen pictures, reached the State
Department from former Belgrade consul Karl L. Rankin with detailed information
about mass executions. Though the number of victims was in dispute and was
considered to be a bit ‘‘fantastic,’’ it was clear ‘‘that many thousands of Serbian civilians
[had] lost their lives’’ at the hands of the Ustasˇe.42 The information presented to the
State Department came from an unnamed Serbian government official and was
therefore potentially easy to refute as exaggeration and propaganda. The anonymous
Serbian official wrote that ‘‘we [Serbians] are confronted with a comprehensive policy
aiming at the extermination of the Serbian race in the regions in question, which would
be preceded by the destruction of the Serbs from an economic standpoint.’’43 The author
details a series of incidents in which the Ustasˇe executed Serbs, starting with the first
attacks at the end of April in and around Bjelovar. These initial slaughters of Serbs set
the tone for the next several months, during which the Ustasˇe terrorized the Serbian
and Jewish populations. Some victimswere slaughtered not by gunshot but in an almost
animal-like fashion, with hammers and knives, their bodies hacked into pieces. Death
by bullet may have been a welcome relief. The author reports that others were killed by
hand grenades. Special attention, the writer notes, was given to the persecution and
execution of Orthodox priests and former Yugoslav politicians. This highly detailed
document includes the names of individuals executed by the Ustasˇe. The author even
mentions the establishment of a concentration camp in Koprivnica.44 Rankin thought
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that the information was of great value and suggested that ‘‘more publicity regarding
atrocities which the Germans are permitting, and which are possible only because of the
German conquest and dismemberment of Yugoslavia, would be helpful to the Serbian
and Allied cause.’’45 Rankin’s advice was not accepted by the State Department.
Rankin’s report came on the heels of a missive from King Peter, then in exile, to
Roosevelt that also addressed the horrors taking place in Croatia. Obviously moved by
news of the massacres, Roosevelt asked his secretary of state, Cordell Hull, whether
Peter’s letter should be made public. Unfortunately, Hull recommended that it be kept
private and that the White House inform the young king that the president had given
the letter his full attention.46 This silence did nothing to draw notice to the tragedy
taking place in Croatia. If anything, by not making a strong, official statement, the US
government enabled zealots for Croatian independence within the United States to
insist that the executions and massacres were nothing but Serbian and Jewish
propaganda. Likewise, the lack of an official statement only fanned the flames of
hatred among Serbian Americans. Without a doubt, domestic peace between Croatian
and Serbian Americans played a major role in the government’s decision, but the
atrocities were so outrageous that it boggles the imagination that any country could or
would keep news of them silent.
Even with the above information in hand, Hull and the State Department refused
to appreciate the scope of what was happening. Only once did the State Department
inquire about the NDH’s policy toward Serbs. On 29 September 1941, Hull asked the
American embassy in Rome to investigate reports of ‘‘mass deportations of Serbs from
Croatia.’’47 There is no record of a response from Rome, but Hull’s lone question, in
spite of the letters and reports already received by the State Department and those
that would pour into Washington later, signified a sense of disinterest as well as
skepticism in Washington. In Hull’s and the State Department’s defense, they were
dealing with numerous reports of mass killings and what would later come to be called
genocide; it was difficult to separate the incidents in Croatia from those taking place in
other corners of the globe. Hull’s lack of curiosity, however, deserves particular
emphasis, especially because information about the slaughter of Serbs and Jews by the
Ustasˇe streamed into the State Department throughout the war. Beginning in 1942,
regular status reports on Croatia were sent to the State Department by Samuel
Honaker, the American consul general in Istanbul, and similar officials. These detailed
and remarkably accurate documents, supplemented with information from Bern, all
paint the same picture: Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇe had slaughtered thousands of Serbs
and Jews, terrorized the countryside, and, in the process, tried to erase any Serbian
heritage from Croatia by destroying Orthodox churches and forcing conversions to
Catholicism.
Although it was difficult to ignore this consistent drumbeat of information, non-
intervention in foreign affairs had been a theme in the State Department during the
1920s and 1930s. Even in Latin America, an arena where the United States had made
numerous intrusions prior to World War I, Washington chose to avoid direct
intervention in the interwar years. Underpinning non-intervention was the ‘‘fear
that insidious alien influences were endangering America’s unique institutions.’’48 The
ideology of nativism, most clearly enunciated in the National Origins Act of 1924,
continued to influence American domestic and foreign policy. Roosevelt was another
factor: he was suspicious of the State Department and never granted officials,
including the secretary of state, much latitude in expanding the role of American
foreign policy.49 Although often chafing under Roosevelt’s leadership style, most
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officials in the State Department had a narrow view of the country’s role in
international affairs and were not eager to change it, especially when dealing with
Croatia. Yugoslavia was a distant place, believed by most in the State Department to
be primarily an area of British interest, far removed from American consciousness.50
Only later in World War II, after the most vicious period of atrocities had passed, did
the United States begin to play as large a role in Yugoslavia as the British did. The
State Department’s inaction can be explained also by its concern over keeping the
peace between Serbian and Croatian Americans, as well as by an undercurrent of anti-
Semitism.51
In part, the blame for America’s slow and restrained response rests not with the
State Department but on the shoulders of the Yugoslav government-in-exile. Wracked
by dissension between Croat and Serb members, it failed to spread the word of
Pavelic´’s murderous spree. Too often Serb and Croat politicians only emphasized their
ethnicity and jockeyed for position to gain the best deal possible for their particular
nationality at the war’s conclusion. Again the Ustasˇe’s atrocities became a political
football. Many Croatians in the government were unwilling to proclaim the truth
about Pavelic´’s murderous regime, mainly because their desire for an independent
Croatia led them to ignore the slaughter. Croatians in the exiled Yugoslavian
government believed that recognizing the NDH’s crimes would place Croatian
interests in an unfavorable light at war’s end. Demanding that the horrors be
proclaimed from the highest mountain, Serbs, such as Konstantin Fotic´, often
incorrectly castigated all Croatians as murderers. Serb nationalists hoped that
information about Ustasˇe atrocities would help justify some of the abusive policies
favored by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslavian government prior to the war. Since
Yugoslavism was a rare bird, most attempts to draft statements damning the NDH’s
actions were sabotaged.52
Regardless of the exiled government’s problems, by early 1942 there were too many
reports detailing the atrocities for there to be any doubt that genocide was taking
place. Accounts from various sources—all repeating the same major themes, some with
more detail than others—were hard to ignore. For example, an account from a ‘‘neutral
businessman’’ who left Croatia in September 1941 states that the Ustasˇe had run
roughshod over the country, terrorizing and murdering Serbs. This businessman, a
resident of Croatia, noted that some sources claimed that 250,000 Serbs had been
slaughtered, a figure exaggerated at this point in the war. ‘‘These mass killings took
place mostly in the country, where Ustasi armed bands went from village to village and
deliberately tried to exterminate every Serb.’’53 In major cities, Serbs had ‘‘almost
disappeared,’’ having been forced into concentration camps, ghettoized, or deported.
The same treatment had been dispensed to the NDH’s Jews: ‘‘They have been
murdered and beaten, sent to concentration camps, herded into railway trucks by the
hundred and allowed to die en route from starvation and exposure.’’54
Even with a wealth of information at hand, Roosevelt’s attention was far from the
activities in the NDH. When young King Peter visited the United States in the summer
of 1942, he delivered to Roosevelt another account of some of the atrocities committed on
Pavelic´’s watch. According to Fotic´, the Yugoslav government-in-exile’s representative
in the United States, the president was ‘‘shocked at the details of Ustashi massacres.’’55
Croatian activities, however, were so far from Roosevelt’s mind that Fotic´, a Serbian
nationalist, had to remind him that the NDHwas at war with the United States. At that
moment, ‘‘the President raised his hands in surprise and said that he had almost
forgotten about that.’’56 Speaking more directly about war crimes, Roosevelt told Peter
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that hewouldmake sure theUstasˇe realized that theywould have to pay for their crimes
at the end of the war, something that, in fact, would happen only in rare cases. More
pointedly, Roosevelt explained that ‘‘he would try especially to impress ‘this man
Pavelic´h.’ ’’57 Roosevelt’s comment screamed ignorance of Pavelic´’s personality and his
movement. The president’s inattention is somewhat understandable, but his glaring
ignorance of the situation in Croatia is surprising. Fotic´ responded to Roosevelt by
noting that the United States could say little that would affect Pavelic´.
In light of Roosevelt’s remarks, it is not surprising that the president never urged
Pope Pius XII to put pressure on Pavelic´ to end the Ustasˇe’s genocide. It is obvious that
other wartime matters occupied the president and took precedence over events in
Croatia.Myron Taylor, however, had a good relationship with the pontiff and could have
raised the issue of Croatian atrocities with him. As US representative to the Vatican,
Taylor, in 1942, asked the papacy to speak out about Axis atrocities. As he did
throughout the war, Pius XII only made indirect comments about the genocidal acts
being committed by the Nazis and their satellite states.58 Since the Vatican enjoyed a
close relationship with the NDH, and Pius XII had held two audiences with Pavelic´ by
the end of 1942, there was at least a possibility that American pressure on the Vatican
might have elicited a few words of restraint in Zagreb. Unfortunately, this opportunity
was missed.
One member of the government was deeply concerned with the NDH’s atrocities.
Roosevelt’s minister to the Yugoslav government-in-exile, A.J. Drexel Biddle, Jr., was
fed a diet of reports from the royalist C´etnik leader Drazˇa Mihailovic´, who was waging a
halting guerilla campaign against the Nazis. These reports were of varying accuracy
and quality, because the exiled government and Mihailovic´ wanted Washington to
believe that they were the only legitimate force waging war against the Germans.
Biddle, one of Roosevelt’s close friends, was told by the government-in-exile that the
NDH had killed about 600,000 Serbian men, women, and children as of September
1942—an exaggerated figure, designed to attract American attention, but not
completely out of the ballpark. Another 300,000 had reportedly been forced out of
their homes. Regardless of the numerical accuracy of these reports, exterminationswere
indeed taking a crushing toll, especially in ethnically diverse Bosnia.59
With so much evidence, including the publication ofMartyrdom of the Serbs by the
Orthodox Church of the United States and Canada, a book that vividly detailed the
Ustasˇe’s crimes, there was no way for the American government to question the scope of
the atrocities being committed in the NDH.60 An Office of War Information (OWI)
document fromAugust 1943 underscoresWashington’s concern about relations between
Serbian and Croatian Americans, explaining that Martyrdom of the Serbs had the
capacity to generate greater disturbances between these two ethnic groups by
tarnishing all Croatians as supporters of Ante Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇe. Interestingly,
the OWI did not question the validity of the publication, noting that ‘‘so far as is known
many of these charges are true’’ and declaring that ‘‘the Ustashi . . . set out to
exterminate the Serbs of Croatia.’’61 The evidence of wholesale slaughter, carried out
in the most despicable fashion, was abundant. Pictures of decapitations, bludgeonings,
and mutilations, followed by detailed reports of the extinction of villages, were not a
closely kept secret. Despite thewealth of information documenting genocidal events, the
US government made few comments. TheWhite House and the State Department were
concerned about domestic unrest between Serbian and Croatian Americans as a by-
product of Pavelic´’s actions in Croatia and decided on a strategy of silence as the best
course. In this way, Roosevelt could avoid offending either nationality while charging
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the OWI, the government body responsible for monitoring America’s various
nationalities, with keeping both Croatian and Serbian Americans united in their
opposition to Nazi Germany.62
The Public Learns of Genocide
TheAmerican public, outside of Serbian- andCroatian-American circles, did not learn of
the Croatian atrocities until 11 October 1941, when a short item appeared on page 3 of
theNewYork Times stating that theUstasˇe hadmurdered 300,000 to 340,000 Serbs and
pro-Yugoslav Croatians. Citing intelligence reports from agents in Croatia and Bosnia,
the anonymous reporter explained that ‘‘nearly 5,000 Serbs were slaughtered by
Croatian Ustashi in a concentration camp outside Yatovo [probably Jadovno]’’;63 the
article describes specific atrocities, some with inflated numbers. This report of
thousands of deaths failed to register with the American public, however; there was
little to no reaction. For most Americans, content with isolationism, Yugoslavia was a
faraway speck on the map with little relevance to American interests. This genocide
seemed distant to Americans, who were trying to enjoy their long Indian summer
outside of the war.
The American responsibility to address this genocide increased dramatically after
Germany declared war on the United States. Hitler’s foolish declaration of war on
11 December 1941 mandated that Pavelic´ follow suit. The poglavnik, always loyal to his
fascist controllers, declaredwar on theUnited States and its Allies on 15December. This
action had the potential to cause ethnic unrest in several American cities, for the United
States was home to the largest Croatian population in the world outside of Croatia.
Likewise, the declaration made it difficult for Pavelic´ to draw much financial,
diplomatic, or moral support from Croatian Americans, who now had to choose sides
in the conflict. Pavelic´’s significant recruiting and media efforts in the United States
during the 1930swould never pay the immense dividends he and his supporters desired.
The cause of Croatian independence had lost most of the sympathy traditionally allotted
by Americans to nationalities seeking independence; instead, Croatia was viewed as
part of Hitler’s Europe, having sold its soul for a chance at a patina of independence
within the fascist world.
With much bigger concerns in the Pacific Theater, the United States paid little
attention to Pavelic´’s declaration; it received, for example, no more than one paragraph
in the New York Times. What damage could Croatia do to American interests? Would
American forces face Croatian troops in battle? Pavelic´’s announcement was recognized,
rightly, as the action of a pawn.
In early 1942, evidence of Croatian atrocities continued to mount with the
publication of a report, issued by the archbishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church,
stating that more than 180,000 people had been killed by the Ustasˇe prior to early
August.64 This document, featuring many grisly details, was forwarded to the US
government, where it was received as authoritative. Nevertheless, government
officials and the media did little more than read the archbishop’s report.
Even at this point, there were no public statements from the White House or the
State Department about the executions and tortures taking place in Croatian
concentration camps or about the vast number of indiscriminate murders. One of
the first confirmable reports of major concentration camps came on 9 March 1942 in a
telegram from Bern. The Wiener Tageblatt had reported that Croatia had spent
120,000,000 kuna to establish ‘‘work camps.’’ Jasenovac was specifically mentioned as
housing 1,050 people, mostly Jews, who were well treated.65 This veneer of legitimacy
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was transparent to anyone in the State Department who followed affairs in the Third
Reich. Unfortunately, the news never reached the American public.
Finally Roosevelt realized that a public declaration was needed to define America’s
position on these and other Axis atrocities. This was especially true because evidence
of odious activities, as well as rumors, many being reported in Serbian and Croatian
newspapers in the United States, was mounting. After receiving a letter from King
Peter II that discussed atrocities being inflicted in Yugoslavia, Roosevelt requested that
some action be taken to ‘‘compel the enemy to discontinue this ruthless slaughter’’ and
asked that the men responsible for these crimes face justice at some later date.
The president decided to make a public declaration pledging that those who had
committed atrocities would be held responsible for their actions. As Biddle said, ‘‘The
President plainly wants to publish something [a response to the atrocities]—including
King Peter’s letter.’’66 Knowing that the State Department would favor making a
minimal statement, if any at all, Biddle sagely added that ‘‘in dealing with atrocities you
do not try to be courteous, or diplomatic, or nice. The subject matter requires that it be
handled with punch.’’67 The State Department was wary of taking unilateral action on
war criminality, preferring to make a statement in cooperation with other Allied states.
Although Peter’s letter of 22 July was the second time the Yugoslav government had
made a request for an American statement on Yugoslav war crimes—the first being on
13 April 1942—the State Department suggested that the White House only produce a
statement in cooperation with the other major Allies.68 The State Department carried
the day. Roosevelt’s reply to King Peter promised to collect evidence of war crimes so
that war criminals could be brought to justice at the end of the conflict. His response,
however, did not go as far as the king had requested and included little more than vague
promises.69
In a public statement, the White House pledged that those who had committed war
crimes would be held responsible for their actions:
The perpetrators of these crimes against civilization can no longer be dealt with merely
as units of the national guilt of the Axis powers. Guilt is personal; and the men, as
individuals, who have thus violated, and who continue to violate the most elementary
rules of civilization, must be held personally accountable. When the time comes—as
come it will—justice must be done, and civilized law must be vindicated.70
These were welcome words; but the statement does not mention Croatia or Yugoslavia
by name. Instead, it was designed as a very general statement on atrocities, carefully
worded so as not to offend any of the Allies or to be a future impediment to united Allied
action against atrocities. Such a statement was a far cry from what King Peter had
hoped for.
The wording of this announcement and others—such as that 7 October 1942, which
declared that war criminals would be tried before courts at the end of the war—did
presage the Moscow Declaration’s Statement on Atrocities, agreed upon by the Big
Three in October 1943. These documents did not mention that quislings and war
criminals fromNazi satellites would be punished, although the Allies resolved to pursue
German war criminals and try them for war crimes at the end of the conflict. The
omission was unfortunate, and certainly it disappointed Serbs and Serbian Americans.
America’s Domestic Concerns
Although a public statement directly damning NDH atrocities was not to be had, the
deaths in Croatia did serve to influence some government action against Pavelic´’s
sympathizers in the United States. There was deep concern in many government
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departments and in the White House that Pavelic´’s activities in Croatia would foment
unrest between Serbian and Croatian Americans. This was all the more important
because many of these immigrants worked in manufacturing sectors that were critical
to the war effort. Most Croatian and Serbian-Americans were members of the working
class and lived in close proximity to one another in industrial cities such as Pittsburgh,
Youngstown, Akron, Chicago, and Detroit. Serbian-Americans were dismayed,
shocked, and full of rage when news of Ustasˇe atrocities reached the United States.
The American Srbobran, the largest and oldest Serbian newspaper in the United
States, reported Pavelic´’s crimes in great detail beginning on 4 November 1941.
In light of the news from Croatia, the paper moved toward a staunchly Serbian
nationalist position, heavily criticizing Pavelic´’s regime and Croatians in general.
American authorities determined that many Serbs had seized on Pavelic´’s killing spree
as an excuse to favor a Greater Serbia at the end of the war. This was a rather cynical
way of looking at the changing Serbian position, although it did have a certain level of
truth. The strong condemnation of Pavelic´, and of Croatians in general, came as no
surprise, considering the magnitude of the news being reported.71 After reading about
the deaths of family members and friends at the hands of the Ustasˇe, Serbian fraternal
organizations and newspapers unsurprisingly took a harsh anti-Croatian position,
laced with a strong dose of Serbian nationalism.
Prior to the birth of the NDH, there was little direct animosity between Serbian and
Croatian Americans, except on the part of fringe elements. The Ustasˇe’s crimes changed
this. It was fortunate for American interests that the Pittsburgh newspaper Nezavisna
Hrvataska Drzˇava (‘‘Independent State of Croatia’’), a Pavelic´ mouthpiece established
in the 1930s, found it more and more difficult to follow its pro-Pavelic´ line as news from
Yugoslavia drifted back to the United States. Before World War II, the Post Office, the
State Department, and the Justice Department repeatedly attempted to close the paper,
without success. After Pavelic´ declared war on the United States, however, the paper,
under the leadership of Luka Grbic´ since 1938, was forced to close its doors in March
1942.72 Its demise was beneficial to the American war effort, since otherwise this
fervently pro-Pavelic´ newspaper would have done nothing but fuel ethnic hatred. But
small numbers of Croatian Americans sympathetic to Pavelic´ continued to spread their
views. In early 1942, the FBI raided Domobran organizations, fraternal groups
established by Ustasˇe operatives in the 1930s, and effectively drove a number of Pavelic´
supporters underground. Although none of the key Domobran members were arrested,
J. Edgar Hoover had made his point; fifth columnists would not exist in the United
States.73
An outspoken advocate of Pavelic´ throughout the 1930s, Ante Dosˇen, as the highest-
profile Pavelic´ operative in the United States, required special attention and had been
arrested in 1941 by US Immigration officials. Dosˇen had been active for years,
organizing support for Pavelic´ among Croatian-American communities and raising
money to fund Pavelic´ and his Ustasˇe operations in Europe. Seemingly always able to
avoid the government’s clutches, he successfully delayed the prosecution of his case and
obtained letters of support from both US senators representing Pennsylvania.74 Clearly
frustrated by the Dosˇen case, an OSS agent very familiar with Pavelic´ sympathizers in
the United States remarked that,
Regardless of our constitutional rights, this man should not receive the benefits of said
rights which he has flagrantly violated for years . . .Even if this man is convicted on
illegal entry and a technical charge of perjury, he still would not receive just
punishment.75
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The United States was unable to get any charges to stick to Dosˇen. As late as the
1970s, he was living in New York City.
Interested in identifying and locating Axis supporters or sympathizers, the OWI
and the FBI believed that the Croatian Catholic Union (CCU), headquartered in Gary,
Indiana, had pro-Pavelic´ members. Articles appearing in its weekly paper, Nasa Nada
(‘‘Our Hope’’), gave the impression that the organization was at least in favor of Croat
separatism and at most pro-Pavelic´. As early as 1941, there was evidence that the CCU
was opposed to any criticism of Pavelic´, or even of Hitler, on the grounds that Nasa
Nada was not a political newspaper. Francis X. Kolander, the paper’s editor,
condemned Pavelic´’s declaration of war against the United States and was
reprimanded by George Rakic´, the CCU’s president and one of its founders.
Kolander was warned not to print articles expressing opposition to Pavelic´ again.76
In May 1942, the FBI recognized that the CCU had ‘‘never issued any statement
condemning the present Quisling government of Dr. Ante Pavilc´h in Croatia.’’77 To no
one’s surprise, the FBI became interested in removing the CCU’s board of directors
from their positions, since they deemed them to be dangerous Nazi sympathizers
operating under the aegis of Ante Pavelic´.78 In the fall of 1942, Kolander was defeated
for re-election to his post as editor of Nasa Nada, partly because he had ‘‘openly
condemned . . .Pavelic´ for having declared a state of war against the United States.’’79
Later, Kolander, who had a son fighting in the US Army, produced a letter written by
Nasa Nada’s new editor, Monsignor M.G. Domladovac, that described the sentiments
of some in the CCU:
Whatever PAVELIC´ may be, he at least has freed Croatians from Serbian chain. That
he is not a traitor . . . is seen from the fact that neither Hitler nor Mussolini believe him,
because Pavelic´’s children and wife are as hostages in Italy so that Hitler and Mussolini
have a guarantee . . .Therefore: As American citizens we are bound to help our new
fatherland in its war, but no one can force us to condemn anyone in the old fatherland
until we know the TRUE situation in the old country.80
Monsignor Domladovac’s comments are interesting, if a bit delusional. Although the
evidence against Pavelic´ was becoming mountainous, the editor refused to condemn
him and, incongruously, sought to support both America and Croatia in their war
efforts, even though Croatia was at war with the United States.
Both the OWI and the OSS were aware of the activities of Dosˇen and Domladovac,
but their concerns went beyond these two figures. Reverend Ivan Stipanovic´ of
Youngstown, Ohio, and Ivan Kresˇic´, editor of Hrvatski List i Danica Hrvatska
(‘‘Croatian Gazette and Croatian Morning Star’’), attracted interest because of their
staunch and public support for Pavelic´. Stipanovic´ served as president of the newly
formed Supreme Council of American Croats, the heir to the dormant Domobran cells
that Branimir Jelic´, a key Pavelic´ operative, and his followers had worked so hard to
establish.81 The actions and beliefs of Stipanovic´ and Domladovac were symbolic of
how Pavelic´’s message had infiltrated Croatian Catholic leadership within the United
States, particularly among Franciscans. Both men were so obsessed with establishing
an independent Croatia that they became blind to the horrors occurring in the NDH.
Hatred of Serbia, combined with intense nationalism and a romantic view of Croatia,
dictated their thoughts and actions.82
As Croatian and Serbian rhetoric escalated, Yugoslavian politicians in the United
States became sources of controversy. Konstantin Fotic´ was accused of ‘‘whipping up
anti-Croat sentiment.’’83 Others believed that Momcilo Nincˇic´, the Yugoslav foreign
minister, was ‘‘the chief instigator of this Greater Serbia campaign.’’84 The State
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Department and the FBI believed that such accusations could elevate Serbian and
Croatian rivalry to the point of seriously damaging the American war effort. At the
State Department, Wallace Murray was fearful of what ethnic rivalry—or
‘‘hyphenisms,’’ as ethnic groups were often called—would do to the United States if
a strong American identity was not accepted by new immigrants. ‘‘I hope I am wrong,’’
he wrote,
but I have the uneasy feeling that we are storing up serious trouble for ourselves in the
future by permitting the propagation of bitter controversial questions among foreign
residents and foreign-born American citizens in this country.85
The battles between Serbian and Croatian newspapers reached such a boiling
point that Elmer Davis, in charge of the OWI, held a meeting with editors of some of
the more influential papers to explain that they had to suspend their ‘‘quarreling.’’
Davis, and the State Department in general, believed that the newspapers were
creating ‘‘a danger to the American war effort.’’86 Fortunately, the division between
Serbs and Croats never did damage the American war machine, partly because most
Serbian- and Croatian-Americans favored the reestablishment of a Yugoslavia at the
war’s end or were largely apathetic with respect to events in the old country. These
immigrants had become Americans.
Though small numbers of Croatian Americans pledged allegiance to Pavelic´, the
vast majority remained fervently loyal to America’s cause and implacable enemies of
the Axis. As we have seen, Croatian Americans were torn between favoring
Yugoslavism, supporting an independent Croatia sanctioned by the United States
and Western Europe, or settling for Pavelic´’s state. The OWI worked tirelessly to
convince Croatian Americans that their first allegiance must be to the United States.
As Davis noted while speaking before the Croatian Conference on 19 September 1942,
‘‘no American citizen can have more than a secondary interest in what government
is workable in the old country. One thing we can be sure of is that (the future
Jugoslavia problem) will be solved there by people rather than by people in this
country.’’87 The OWI’s chief concern was to unite Serbian and Croatian Americans in
the crusade against the Axis. Dissent between the two would only harm the war effort,
as Davis emphatically explained at a meeting of Slavic leaders held in the State
Department on 18 September 1942.88
Croatian organizations in the United States made an appeal to meet on 20–21
February 1943 in Chicago to proclaim just such sentiments. In their call for action,
these prominent mainstream Croatian-American organizations clearly demonstrated
support for the United States and condemned Pavelic´. They proclaimed that ‘‘those
who follow Pavelic´h are baiting Croatians against the Serb people’’ and maintained
that Pavelic´ and Serbian strongman Milan Nedic´ were ‘‘heirlings’’ of Hitler and
Mussolini.89 They went so far as to call Pavelic´ a bandit. Delegates were careful,
however, to mention the Ustasˇe’s atrocities only vaguely. This is understandable, but
regrettable, as a clear denunciation of Pavelic´’s crimes would probably have won them
a great deal of respect from the American government and the grudging esteem of
Serbian-American groups. This meeting was followed in September 1943 by the Sixth
Convention of the Croatian Fraternal Union (CFU), the largest Croatian organization
in America, at which Croatian representatives pledged their loyalty to the United
States and their devotion to the war effort while rejecting Pavelic´ and his movement.90
Although there were varying political positions on both right and left in the CFU, it
was becoming clear that very few Croatian Americans could support Pavelic´’s policies,
regardless of whether or not there was an independent Croatia. Only obsessively
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nationalistic and ardently anti-Communist groups such as the CCU were willing to
tolerate Pavelic´’s regime.
Roosevelt and Croatia’s Future
The NDH’s atrocities, however, were an important influence on Allied views of a post-
war Yugoslavia. Considering the horrific events, could Croats and Serbs live peacefully
in a reunited Yugoslavia, or was separation the only viable answer? Roosevelt hinted
at his opinion of post-war Yugoslavia as early as October 1942, in a meeting with Fotic´.
Sympathetic with the Serbs and fond of their young king, Roosevelt informed the
ambassador that Serbian desires were paramount, considering their commitment to
the Allied cause. Roosevelt did not oppose the continuation of Yugoslavia; instead, he
wished for South Slavs to determine their fate without its being dictated to them by
Western powers.91 These opinions were suitably vague, for the early part of the war, to
allow Roosevelt to alter his views as events dictated.
The president’s opinions had shifted somewhat by early 1943. In a meeting with
Anthony Eden and Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt contended that the Croats and Serbs had
virtually nothing in common and that the concept of reuniting them in one state was
‘‘ridiculous.’’ Roosevelt believed that Serbia deserved to emerge as an independent state,
while Croatia would exist under a trusteeship of some sort. All of this had the obscurity
of casual conversation. Influenced to some extent by the Yugoslavian government-in-
exile, Eden thought that Yugoslavia could exist againwithCroat and Serb side by side.92
Post-war Yugoslavian affairs were far from the president’s main concern. In discussions
surrounding the Moscow Declaration, which dealt with holding war criminals
responsible for their crimes at the end of the war, little was said about Yugoslavia’s
ultimate fate. The president merely reiterated his position that ‘‘Croatia may have to be
set up separately from Serbia.’’93 Neither Britain nor the United States believed that
Tito would forge a united Yugoslavia under his star power and the Communist banner.
Interestingly, the regular situation reports on Croatia that littered State
Department files appear to have had only limited effect in altering the views of the
White House. From these documents, it was obvious that Pavelic´ and the Ustasˇe had
ravaged the country, annihilated its economy, and destroyed tens of thousands of lives.
The reports made for interesting reading, but they were largely ignored by both the
White House and the State Department.
Conclusion
American information about NDH atrocities was exceptionally and surprisingly
accurate and detailed. A mere two weeks after the horrific assaults on Serbs began, the
US State Department had reliable evidence that atrocities were occurring. Although
the evidence mounted as weeks turned into months, and it became clear that the
Ustasˇe’s assaults had expanded to include the Jewish population as well, neither the
White House nor the State Department ever uttered a public word specifically
condemning the NDH’s actions. Regardless of appeals by King Peter, silence remained.
American authorities did issue statements condemning atrocities, but only in vague
and almost neutral terms. Likewise, neither the State Department nor President
Roosevelt made any effort to pressure the Vatican to counsel restraint in the NDH.
Although it is far from certain that American pressure would have influenced the
Vatican to act, it is certain that no such attempt was made. In part, the lack of
response was because the State Department considered Croatia—and Yugoslavia,
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for that matter—a British region of influence, distant from American interests. Only in
the months prior to the German invasion had the United States directed attention to
Yugoslavia. The White House and the State Department concerned themselves with
the more significant states in Europe, paying only modest attention to the wide-scale
atrocities being committed in Croatia.
This case study of American response to a lesser-known genocide illustrates the
complex issues that governments face when confronting such atrocities. It is tempting
to offer stern criticism of American inaction on this issue; however, the genocide did
move policy makers to action in the United States. US authorities were quick to realize
that atrocities in the NDH had the capacity to elevate friction between Croatian and
Serbian Americas. This concern was very real to the OWI, the FBI, the White House,
and the State Department, and each of these agencies focused on keeping the
American war effort moving forward while preventing any fifth-column elements from
emerging. A detailed public statement from the White House or the State Department
condemning Pavelic´’s actions might have served only to increase ethnic tensions in the
United States, and speaking out on NDH atrocities would have meant making
statements on all ethnicities under assault by fascist regimes. Most likely, such a
‘‘bidding war’’ would only have led to greater ethnic tension in the country. The State
Department was convinced that any statement on wartime atrocities needed to be
made in cooperation with the Allies. It was deemed best to allow the OWI to monitor
Serbian-American and Croatian-American newspapers and organizations, urging
them to moderate their nationalism-laced views. The OWI stressed to both Croatian-
and Serbian-American communities that their allegiance was to the United States and
not to Croatia or Serbia. Likewise, the FBI was used to squelch the pro-Pavelic´ forces
that had been active in the country since the early 1930s. In this manner, the genocide
in Croatia had a direct effect on US domestic policy decisions. In the final analysis,
although genocide was perpetrated in Croatia, American authorities remained silent,
choosing instead to make exceedingly pragmatic decisions designed to maintain a
peaceful and productive war effort.
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